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INTRODUCTION 
Litigating a claim in the United States is an expensive affair.1 Potential 
plaintiffs must be prepared to pay a host of fees, including court fees, lawyers’ 
fees, bond requirements, and expert witness fees. The accumulation of these fees 
has created what Judge Richard Posner termed a “liquidity problem” in civil 
litigation, as potential plaintiffs lack the capital necessary to pursue a claim.2 This 
liquidity problem has, in turn, caused an access to justice problem—people with 
potentially meritorious claims lack the “key to the courthouse door.”3  
Fortunately for potential plaintiffs, several alternative financing schemes 
exist in the United States whereby someone else pays to litigate a plaintiff’s claim, 
an arrangement that is broadly known as third-party litigation finance (TPLF). 
Among the several available forms of TPLF,4 the American form is unique in that 
plaintiffs can pay for representation through a contingency fee contract, in which 
the lawyer shoulders the costs of litigation in exchange for a percentage of the 
settlement.5 In this system, plaintiffs’ attorneys are freely able to pursue as many 
claims as are presented to them. Nevertheless, they are constrained in the number 
of cases they pursue by how much capital they have to finance those cases.6  
Recently, however, the rules of the game have changed, possibly making it 
harder for plaintiffs’ attorneys to litigate claims. For several decades, since the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Conley v. Gibson,7 a plaintiff could often have her case 
heard by pleading the most basic elements of her claim—the basic facts of the 
situation giving rise to the claim (e.g., the plaintiffs name and the date) and the 
cause of action.8 The Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly9 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal 10 instituted a heightened pleading standard which now requires a more fact-
 
1. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Apportioning Due Process: Preserving the Right to Affordable Justice, 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 437, 440 (2010); Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 501, 516–19 (2012); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 9 
(1986); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 
DUKE L.J. 765, 769–71 (2010). 
2. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 783 (8th ed. 2011) (“The solution to 
this liquidity problem is the contingent fee contract.”). 
3. Philip H. Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual’s Key to the Courthouse Door, LITIG., Summer 
1976, at 27, 27; see infra Part II.A, for a discussion on access to justice. 
4. See infra Part II. 
5. ALEXANDER TABARROK & ERIC HELLAND, TWO CHEERS FOR CONTINGENT FEES 6–7 
(2005); Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 727, 
767–68 (2006); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 
DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 270–71 (1998); Ted Schneyer, Legal-Process Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyers’ 
Contingent Fee Contracts, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376–77 (1998). 
6. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE 
LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 10–14 (2004). 
7. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
8. See infra Part I. 
9. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550. U.S. 544 (2007). 
10. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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based claim, imposing on the plaintiff and her attorney the need to engage in 
costly prefiling investigations to uncover such facts.11 This requirement might 
have hampered the ability of plaintiffs’ lawyers to deliver access to justice. 
Academics and practitioners have debated the effect that the heightened pleading 
standard has had on plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs.12 An emerging consensus 
suggests that the new standard has resulted in fewer claims being heard by judges, 
either because of higher grant rates of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim or because fewer suits are filed.13 Similar studies suggest that the 
decrease in litigation has been partially caused by the inability of plaintiffs or 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to afford expensive prefiling investigations to meet the heightened 
pleading standard.14 The new pleading standard, it seems, has created a liquidity 
problem for some plaintiffs’ attorneys, making it more expensive and less likely 
that a plaintiff’s attorney will file a case. 
This Note suggests that, in light of heightened pleading standards, decreased 
access to justice, and capital constraints, plaintiffs’ lawyers and potential litigants 
need to search for new ways to finance litigation. Such a fix may already be at 
hand. Over the last several years, a controversial new model of TPLF has 
developed that could potentially alleviate the burden imposed by Twombly and 
Iqbal.15 In exchange for a portion of any settlement, financial groups have offered 
plaintiffs’ attorneys cash to fund litigation efforts.16 Although the practice is 
regulated and pervasive in Australia,17 it is largely unregulated and rare in the 
 
11. See infra Part I. 
12. JOSHUA CIVIN & DEBO P. ADEGBILE, RESTORING ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF 
IQBAL AND TWOMBLY ON FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION (2010), available at http://www
.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Civin_Adegbile_Iqbal_Twombly.pdf; see also JOE S. CECIL ET AL., 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL, at vii 
(2011) [hereinafter CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMISS AFTER IQBAL], available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Publications/motioniqbal.pdf; JOE S. CECIL ET 
AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(b)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH 
LEAVE TO AMEND 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter CECIL ET AL., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF 12(b)(6) 
MOTIONS], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal2.pdf/$file/
motioniqbal2.pdf. 
13. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and 
Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2332 (2012). 
14. Whether the Supreme Court Has Limited Americans’ Access to Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 16 (2009) [hereinafter Americans’ Access to Court ] (statement of Stephen B. 
Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania), 
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-02-09%20Burbank%20Testimony
.pdf ; Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 67 (2010). 
15. JONATHAN T. MOLOT, THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LITIGATION RISK 6–9 (2012), 
available at http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Burford_Whitepaper11.pdf. 
16. STEVEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: 
ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 13 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional
_papers/OP306.html; William Alden, Looking to Make a Profit on Lawsuits, Firms Invest in Them, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 1, 2012, at B3; Dan McDonald, Third-Party Litigation Financing: Is It Really Taking Off?, R.I. 
LAW. WKLY. (Feb. 2, 2012), http://rilawyersweekly.com/blog/2012/02/02/third-party-litigation-
financing. 
17. David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market For Justice: A First Empirical Look at Third 
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United States, except for a few notable cases.18 Perhaps most famously, the 
plaintiffs’ attorney who represented a group of Ecuadorians suing Chevron for 
environmental claims received over $4 million in litigation finance from Burford 
Capital.19 
Because of the newness and novelty of this practice, attorneys, financiers, 
and regulators are still exploring and attempting to understand its implications. To 
date, much of the discussion surrounding the new form of TPLF has focused on 
either its impact on the attorney-client relationship or on the supply-side dynamics 
of how investing should be regulated.20 Little is known, however, about who 
might benefit from the further expansion of this form of TPLF and how that 
expansion might occur.21  
This Note will argue that this new form of TPLF could be expanded to help 
plaintiffs’ attorneys surmount the new pleading standard, thereby increasing access 
to justice. By providing plaintiffs’ attorneys with capital, TPLF might enable them 
to afford the prefiling investigations required to survive a motion to dismiss, in 
the process reopening the courtroom door. But expanding TPLF is not without 
risks, including the possibility of increased filings of frivolous claims, fraud, and 
the erosion of the attorney-client relationship. Because of these risks, this Note 
will further propose a new regulatory regime that should be adopted to ensure that 
this new form of TPLF can benefit all classes of plaintiffs.  
Part I of this Note argues that access to justice is limited by at least two 
factors: the costs of litigation and a heightened pleading standard. The heightened 
pleading standard has shifted some costs onto the plaintiff that used to be 
 
Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075, 1084 (2013); Nicholas Dietsch, Litigation Financing in 
the U.S., the U.K., and Australia: How the Industry Has Evolved in Three Countries, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 687, 
702–05 (2011). 
18. See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 1268, 1289–92 (2011). 
19. Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2012, at 38. 
20. See Courtney R. Barksdale, All That Glitters Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the Costs and Benefits of 
Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707, 710–16 (2007); Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party 
Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 575–76 (2010); Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation 
Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 55, 56–57 (2004); Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 
GEO. L.J. 65, 104–05 (2010); Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
455, 456 (2012); Mariel Rodak, Comment, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the Litigation 
Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 503–04 (2006); A.B.A. Comm’n on 
Ethics 20/20, White Paper on Alternative Litigation Finance 15–16 (Draft 2011), available at  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111019_draft_alf
_white_paper_posting.authcheckdam.pdf. 
21. Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 593, 608–09 (2012). To date, only a few studies have investigated who might benefit from an 
expansion of TPLF. See Bruce L. Beron & Jason E. Kinsella, David vs. Goliath Patent Cases: A Search for 
the Most Practical Mechanism of Third Party Litigation Financing for Small Plaintiffs, 38 N. KY. L. REV 605, 
609 (2011). 
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incurred by the defendant during discovery;22 now those costs are carried by 
plaintiffs who choose to engage in prefiling investigations.23 Unable to bear these 
costs, fewer plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs see a claim survive a 12(b)(6) motion. 
Part II of this Note discusses the various forms of TPLF available to plaintiffs and 
shows that the inability to pay for the costs of litigation has been a theme of the 
American courtroom experience.24 The “cause model” of TPLF—where TPLF is 
supplied by legal aid societies, the pro bono programs of law firms, and private 
public interest law firms—has helped litigants with civil rights and constitutional 
claims reach the courtroom.25 Plaintiffs whose claims fall outside of the cause 
model may pursue their claim through a “profit model” of TPLF supplied by 
contingency fee lawyers. This part concludes with an examination of how 
institutional constraints placed on each third-party financier have created 
segmented markets in TPLF, where each financier serves a specific type of 
plaintiff. 
Part III of this Note argues that expansion of TPLF could have a profound 
impact on contingency fee lawyers, with the further benefit of expanding access to 
justice. Unlike larger law firms that have lines of credit from banks, contingency 
fee lawyers generally self-finance litigation. This need to self-finance cases imposes 
serious capital constraints on plaintiffs’ attorneys. Without access to financing, 
contingency fee lawyers have typically operated under a “portfolio” business 
model, whereby settlements from a number of low-risk, low-reward claims 
provide the capital necessary to finance a small number of high-risk, high-reward 
claims.26 Making this new form of TPLF available to a contingency fee lawyer 
would enable the lawyer to pursue claims that she would otherwise have had to 
decline because of limited capital; access to increased capital could possibly aid the 
lawyer’s ability to surmount the additional costs imposed by Twombly and Iqbal.  
Part IV explores the concerns with further expanding this form of TPLF and 
concludes with suggestions for how the practice could be regulated. Current laws 
in several states against champerty, which proscribes “maintaining a suit in return 
for a financial interest in the outcome,” and maintenance, which proscribes 
“helping another prosecute a suit,” prohibit expansions of TPLF.27 But many 
states have not enforced the laws for decades, while others have fully abandoned 
 
22. See, e.g., ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
217 (2003); Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636 (1989). 
23. Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing? What’s Happened to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 598 (2011). 
24. Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 194–95 (2001). 
25. Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well by Doing Better, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2357, 2359 (2010); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and American-Style 
Civil Legal Assistance, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 79, 80–81 (2007). 
26. KRITZER, supra note 6, at 12–13. 
27. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424–25 n.15 (1978); see also Lyon, supra note 20, at 579. 
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the rules.28 This lack of enforcement means that the new form of TPLF is largely 
unregulated in many states. While certain groups, such as the United States 
Chamber of Commerce, advocate for a full prohibition of investing in lawsuits,29 a 
more balanced regulatory regime would ensure that TPLF can benefit a diverse 
class of plaintiffs. 
I. INITIATING LITIGATION 
For decades, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) required that 
plaintiffs only had to provide the most basic facts in a complaint to have their 
claim heard by a judge. After the Supreme Court rulings of Twombly and Iqbal, 
plaintiffs had a higher bar to clear and are now required to plead more facts. As 
this Part will discuss, the higher bar plaintiffs have had to clear post-Twombly and 
Iqbal has decreased access to justice. Facts that plaintiffs once gained during 
discovery—after their claim survived a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim—are now required at the pleading stage. As the costs of discovery 
are often disproportionally paid for by the defendants, plaintiffs must now engage 
in costly prefiling investigations to increase their chances of surviving a motion to 
dismiss. This Part will suggest that this increased cost has kept many from having 
their day in court. 
* * * 
Promulgated in 1938 by the Supreme Court, the FRCP ensured that a 
potential plaintiff who had a claim would have her case heard by a judge.30 Before 
1938, a complaint—the form submitted by a plaintiff to a court stating the 
plaintiff’s claim for relief—had to include “‘[a] statement of the facts constituting 
the cause of action.’”31 Exactly which facts had to be included in that statement, 
however, was vague; “ultimate” facts had to be included in the pleading, while 
“evidentiary” facts and “conclusions of law” were to be left out of pleadings.32 
The rule drafters worried that these requirements screened cases too early in the 
 
28. See, e.g., Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003); 
Saldini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224 (Mass. 1997). 
29. See JOHN BEISNER ET AL., SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE 1–2 (2009), available at 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/images/stories/documents/pdf/research/thirdparty
litigationfinancing.pdf (“The stranger wants to protect its investment, and its interest lies in 
maximizing its return on that investment, not in vindicating a plaintiff’s rights.”). 
30. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 990 (2003) 
(citing Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 318–19 (1938)). 
31. Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 447 
(2009) (quoting Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379 § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 521). 
32. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 821, 824–25 (2010); Dodson, supra note 14, at 57; Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1752–54 (1998); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986) [hereinafter Marcus, The 
Revival ].  
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adjudication process. To remedy the nebulous requirements, the rule drafters 
scrapped the required factual statement from the pleading. Rule 8(a)(2) of the 
FRCP required only that plaintiffs plead “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ 
that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.”33 This short and plain statement, dubbed “notice 
pleading,”34 served three purposes: it ensured that a plaintiff would have a day in 
court, it “inform[ed] the opponent of the affair or transaction to be litigated . . . 
and [told] the court of the broad outlines of the case.”35 According to one scholar, 
the effect of “notice pleading” embodied the “liberal ethos” of the rule drafters,36 
a sentiment that “[p]laintiffs . . . should have ‘the opportunity to present their case 
to [a] Federal judge even when they [do] not yet have [a] full set of facts.’”37  
In practice, plaintiffs had to divulge the most basic details of their claim to 
gain access to a judge. But the task was not an onerous one—plaintiffs had to 
include the name of the parties, the circumstances, and the cause of action.38 If the 
pleading lacked such details, or if the pleading was “so vague or ambiguous that 
the party cannot reasonably prepare a response,” the defendant could utilize Rule 
12(e) to motion to dismiss for a more definite statement.39 Defendants also had 
the option to file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.40 But the Supreme Court, in Conley v. Gibson, 
declared that such motions should only be granted if “it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief.”41 In other words, the Court ruled that Rule 12(b)(6) motions 
should not be granted simply because a plaintiff failed to plead with factual 
simplicity. Rather, such a motion should only be granted if the facts do not exist 
anywhere.  
By allowing a claim to proceed past the pleading stage with minimal factual 
detail, the Court shifted some costs from plaintiff to defendant. When a plaintiff 
initiates filing a claim, the plaintiff herself likely does not possess all of the facts 
necessary to carry her claim through trial. Depending on the type of claim, many 
of the facts that she needs might be in the possession of the defendant or other 
third parties. But if a court requires a fact-based pleading, gathering those details 
 
33. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
34. Id. 
35. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460–61 (1943). 
36. Marcus, The Revival, supra note 32, at 439–40. 
37. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Access to Justice Within the Federal Courts—A Ninth Circuit 
Perspective, 90 OR. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2012) (quoting Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing 
Before Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
4 (2009) (statement of Henry C. Johnson, Jr., Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties)). 
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
39. Id. at 12(e). 
40. Id. at 12(b)(6). 
41. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
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would require plaintiffs to finance and conduct prefiling investigations. Conley, 
however, abrogated the need for most prefiling investigations. Such details that 
might have been uncovered during a prefiling investigation would likely be 
revealed when plaintiffs gained access to discovery—the process through which 
defendants turn over documents to the plaintiffs after the pleading stage. Unlike a 
prefiling investigation, through discovery, plaintiffs’ lawyers can get access to 
important documents and facts without paying significant costs; through 
discovery, the defendants must marshal all of the documents in the defendants’ 
possession for the plaintiff.42 By shifting those costs to the defendants, a plaintiff 
could access a judge with having paid little more than court filing fees and 
attorney fees.  
The impact of the rulings by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal, 
however, may have shifted those costs back to plaintiffs. In Twombly, the Court 
amended the Conley “no set of facts” standard slightly by requiring “enough facts 
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”43 What exactly “plausible” 
means has proved amorphous.44 The Court suggested that “plausible” is more 
than “conceivable” but less than “probable.”45 But while Twombly only slightly 
changed the pleading standard, the Court in Iqbal raised the bar higher by ruling 
that when a court considers a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court may 
weed out conclusory statements from the claim and focus solely on the factual 
allegations.46 This ruling requires that plaintiffs make “more than an unadorned, 
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” and include facts in their 
pleading that support such a claim.47 In making these rulings, the Court attempted 
to reduce the number of frivolous claims filed while also attempting to limit the 
imposition of excessive discovery costs on defendants.48 Such a requirement has 
the possibility to increase costs for a plaintiff substantially. If a plaintiff was not 
personally in possession of such facts, a prefiling investigation conducted at their 
own expense would be necessary.  
One recent slip-and-fall negligence case demonstrates how a judge dismissed 
 
42. BONE, supra note 22, at 217; Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of 
Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 884 n.56, 933–34 (2009); Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 636; 
Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2093 (2002); Yeazell, supra note 
24, at 194–95. 
43. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
44. Countless articles have attempted to dissect the meaning of the rulings. See, e.g., Benjamin 
P. Cooper, Iqbal’s Retro Revolution, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 937, 938 n.7 (2011). 
45. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 32, at 826. 
46. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
47. Id. at 677. According to one scholar, Iqbal completely rejected the Conley standard by 
requiring that “a claim must always be properly supported by factual detail alleged in the complaint. 
Other facts uncovered in discovery may be used to support the claims, but the complaint itself must 
be able to stand on its own allegations.” Dodson, supra note 14, at 62. 
48. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 32, at 850. 
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a plaintiff’s claim through a Rule 12(b)(6) motion due to a lack of facts in the 
pleading. In June 2007, Holly Branham visited a Dollar General Store in Amherst 
County Virginia.49 Branham alleged in her complaint that once in the store, she 
slipped and fell on liquid pooled on the store’s floor, that she suffered injuries—
severe and permanent—because of the fall, and that the defendant negligently 
failed to remove the liquid or to warn her of its presence.50 Under the old notice 
pleading regime, this complaint contained all of the components needed to survive 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Indeed, the complaint is nearly identical to the 
illustrative civil rules forms that accompany the FRCP.51 Judge Norman Moon, 
however, granted the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because “the 
Plaintiff ha[d] failed to allege any facts that show[ed] how the liquid came to be on 
the floor, whether the Defendant knew or should have known of the presence of 
the liquid, or how the Plaintiff’s accident occurred.”52 Judge Moon, however, gave 
Braham fifteen days to amend the complaint53 and to submit a “well-pleaded 
factual allegation[ ]” as required by Iqbal.54 Branham’s amended complaint, which 
survived all Rule 12 motions, contained greater factual detail uncovered during the 
prefiling investigation, including the name of the worker at the store, details of the 
conversation between the plaintiff and defendant’s employee, and the conditions 
within the store at the time of the accident.55 
The effect of the need for prefiling investigations is only now being 
understood. Several studies conducted shortly after the Iqbal ruling suggest that 
the heightened pleading standard has had no effect on litigants. One study 
undertaken by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) that examined the grant rates of 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions in the years before and after Twombly noted that “[t]here 
was no increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at which a grant of a motion to 
dismiss terminated the case.”56 More recent studies, however, have attacked the 
thinness of the FJC study. One such study found that the heightened pleading 
standard has resulted in roughly twenty percent fewer plaintiffs surviving Rule 
 
49. Complaint at 1, Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037 (W.D. Va. June 30, 
2009). 
50. Id. 
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 11. While the filer of the complaint must also include statements 
for diversity jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction, and admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, the 
pleading component of the illustrative civil rules form only states “[o]n <Date>, at <Place>, the 
defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff was 
physically injured, lost wages or income, suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical 
expenses of $ <_____>. Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant for $ 
<_____>, plus costs.” 
52. See Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL 2604447, at *2 (W.D. Va. 
Aug. 24, 2009). 
53. Id. 
54. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
55. Amended Complaint at 1, Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037 (W.D. Va. 
Aug. 9, 2009). 
56. CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMISS AFTER IQBAL, supra note 12, at vii; see also CECIL ET 
AL., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF 12(b)(6) MOTIONS, supra note 12, at 1. 
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12(b)(6) motions, with an unknown number of plaintiffs simply choosing not to 
file.57  
Another recent study found that the heightened standard has had a disparate 
impact depending on the types of case filed.58 The study drew on a database that 
included 500 randomly selected cases submitted in the two years before Twombly 
and 500 cases submitted in the year period after Iqbal.59 Claims based on 
constitutional civil rights suffered the most under Iqbal when compared to their 
fate under Conley; courts after Iqbal granted Rule 12(b)(6) motions with and 
without leave to amend sixty-four percent of the time. Under the Conley standard, 
the similar grant rate was forty-one percent. Other classes of claims suffered 
similar setbacks: Rule 12(b)(6) motions with and without leave to amend filed 
against Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) claims under Conley were granted thirty-seven percent of the 
time and sixty percent of the time under Iqbal; for consumer credit claims, the 
motions were granted thirty-six percent of the time under Conley and seventy-two 
percent of the time under Iqbal; and for contract claims, the motions were granted 
twenty-five percent of the time under Conley and thirty-three percent of the time 
under Iqbal.60  
Exactly why plaintiffs fail to meet the new pleading standard is unclear. 
While some plaintiffs likely fail to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because the facts 
they need are held by a party who does not have to turn over requests for 
information before discovery,61 other plaintiffs likely fail to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion because “they lack the resources to engage in extensive pre-filing 
investigation[s],”62 as was perhaps the case for Branham noted above.  
 
57. Gelbach, supra note 13, at 2332; see also Dodson, supra note 14, at 67; Patricia W. Hatamyar, 
The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 597–602, 614 
(2010); Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: As Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study 
of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 32 (2012). 
58. Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 
46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 609 (2012) (providing difference from Conley to Iqbal for motions granted in 
full with and without leave to amend went from forty-six percent to sixty-one percent). 
59. Hatamyar, supra note 57, at 584–89. The updated database thus includes 1326 cases: 444 
decided under Conley, 422 decided under Twombly, and 460 decided under Iqbal. 
60. Moore, supra note 58, at 626–27. The study included information on others types of 
claims filed (e.g., tort and intellectual property), but the results were not statistically significant. Id. 
at 618. 
61. Damon C. Andrews, Iqbal-ing Seagate: Plausibility Pleading of Willful Patent Infringement, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1955, 1966–67 (2010); Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New 
Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 254–78 (2012); J. 
Scott Pritchard, The Hidden Costs of Pleading Plausibility: Examining the Impact of Twombly and Iqbal on 
Employment Discrimination Complaints and the EEOC’s Litigation and Mediation Efforts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 
757, 775–89 (2011); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The 
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 524–26 
(2010). 
62. Americans’ Access to Court, supra note 14, at 16. 
         
2015] THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCE 207 
 
The costs of prefiling investigations, however, burden the already liquidity-
strained litigant. A potential plaintiff must be prepared to pay a host of fees if she 
chooses to file a claim in the United States. These costs include the court fees to 
file the case, the hourly fees of a lawyer who will litigate on behalf of the plaintiff, 
fees to pay expert witnesses if her case calls for it, and other possible fees 
depending on the type of claim she is filing.63 The sum of these fees has created 
what Judge Richard Posner termed “a liquidity problem,”64 in which plaintiffs with 
potentially meritorious claims cannot afford to bring those claims to court due to 
capital constraints. Other scholars have expressed concern over how systemic this 
liquidity problem has become. Scott Cummings, in a study of how liquidity-
strained plaintiffs access the courts, similarly noted that there is a “market 
inequality” in the availability of legal services.65 As Cummings wrote, “individuals, 
despite suffering a legal harm, are blocked from legal redress because they are too 
poor to pay for a lawyer.”66  
And as Judge Moon’s opinion above indicates, the new pleading standards 
set by Twombly and Iqbal can serve as a barrier to justice for the most basic legal 
claims. While Twombly involved an antitrust claim against telephone companies67 
and Iqbal involved a torture claim against the Attorney General of the United 
States and the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,68 Branham was a 
simple slip-and-fall case.69 While the heightened pleading standards set by the 
Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal only apply to actions filed in federal courts,70 
many state courts, where ninety-five percent of claims are filed,71 have also 
adopted the standard. To be sure, one study of pleading standards in state courts 
reveals that the seven states that replicate the FRCP for actions filed in state 
courts have adopted the Twombly and Iqbal standard; five other states that do not 
 
63. Martin Gramatikov, A Framework for Measuring the Costs of Paths to Justice, J. JURIS, Feb. 
2009, at 111, 116; David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 92–94 
(1983). 
64. POSNER, supra note 2, at 783. 
65. Scott L. Cummings, The Pursuit of Legal Rights—and Beyond, 59 UCLA L. REV. 506, 523 
(2012). 
66. Id. 
67. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007). 
68. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009). 
69. Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL 2604447, at *1 (W.D. Va. 
Aug. 24, 2009). 
70. A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, PLEADING IN STATE COURTS AFTER TWOMBLY AND IQBAL 10 
(2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038349 (reporting that all of the federal circuits have 
“embraced [Twombly and Iqbal ] with zeal”). 
71. Compare R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK 
OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 1 (2012), available at http://
www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx (listing 
total number of filings in state courts in 2010), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 209 tbl.332 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/
2012/tables/12s0332.pdf (listing the number of filings in federal district courts in 2010). 
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replicate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have also mentioned Twombly and 
Iqbal during discussions of fact-based pleading standards.72 
Although Twombly and Iqbal are relatively new rules, their combined impact 
has changed the nature of pleading standards and, in effect, changed who can have 
their claim heard by a judge. A plaintiff, regardless of the monetary size of her 
claim, regardless of the complexity of her cause of action, and regardless of 
whether she files her claim in a federal court or state court, can expect to need to 
plead more facts than she would have needed to plead ten years ago. This need to 
plead more facts equates to the need to spend more money at the outset of a case. 
But how is the cash-strapped plaintiff supposed to find the needed money? 
II. GETTING THIRD PARTIES TO PAY FOR LITIGATION 
Depending on the type of claim, a cash-strapped plaintiff in the United 
States might be able to get her claim paid for by someone else through a TPLF 
arrangement. TPLF is most broadly defined as an arrangement in which a party 
not privy to a claim assumes the litigation expenses for a party privy to the claim.73 
These arrangements have developed in the United States “in recognition that the 
ordinary marketplace for legal services fails to provide such services to significant 
sectors of the population and to significant interests.”74  
As this part will examine, the third parties that provide financing fall into 
two broad groups. The first group finances litigation because it hopes the 
outcome will further a cause (the “cause model”). The financiers include 
community civil legal aid societies, private public interest law firms, and the pro 
bono programs at private law firms. The second group finances litigation to 
generate a monetary return on its investment (the “profit model”). This group is 
largely populated by contingency fee lawyers. Of the types of claims financers in 
each group pursue, institutional constraints limit their efforts. These constraints, 
which have evolved over the course of the twentieth century, have created a 
segmented market in third-party litigation finance, where each type of financier 
services a particular type of plaintiff. Ultimately, however, the interplay of the 
various constraints have left a subset of plaintiffs without access to financing and, 
thus, without easy access to courts. This part will begin to make the claim that, 
because of an expected monetary return on investment, an expansion of TPLF 
will most benefit contingency fee lawyers. 
A. The Cause Model 
Litigation finance provided under the cause model is generally given to 
 
72. SPENCER, supra note 70, at 15–17. 
73. Lyon, supra note 20, at 577; Steinitz, supra note 18, at 1275–76. 
74. Scott L. Cummings, Privatizing Public Interest Law, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1 (2012). 
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benefit a single cause or a low-income individual. To understand how the cause 
model works today, a grasp of how the model developed is necessary.  
1. Civil Legal Aid Societies  
The movement toward providing legal services to the poorer sectors of the 
community began in the late nineteenth century; lawyers donated their services 
directly to community members who could not otherwise afford to hire a lawyer 
to settle simple, civil disputes.75 By the early twentieth century, local community 
civil legal aid societies, formed through charitable organizations, paid for attorneys 
to represent indigent clients.76 The attorneys who participated in the programs 
often provided their services for a reduced fee or for no fee at all, as a 
“professional charity.”77 Through these societies, attorneys “operated as neutral 
partisans for the poor, advocating for client goals.”78 By the second decade of the 
twentieth century, state bars helped expand the programs.79 While only 40 legal aid 
societies existed in 1919 in the largest cities, 92 cities had legal aid societies by 
1950, and 209 cities by 1960.80 Then, in 1965, as part of the “War on Poverty,” the 
federal government created the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to 
distribute federal funds to finance civil legal services for the poor.81 The effect was 
enormous. In the first two years, 300 legal aid societies received federal funding 
that amounted to eight times the total amount received by legal aid societies in 
1965.82 In the same time period, “800 new law offices and almost 2000 new 
lawyers were funded [by the OEO].”83 By 1971, the offices funded by the OEO 
processed 1,237,275 cases, up from 426,457 in 1965.84  
The greatest impact of the early OEO funded programs was on larger 
causes. OEO funded programs initiated litigation to reform laws and institutions 
that affected underrepresented groups of people. Indeed, over the course of the 
first decade, several OEO-funded societies “won significant victories, largely in 
reforming and expanding federal entitlement programs,” including the expansion 
 
75. Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11 (2004). 
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80. Alan W. Houseman, Legal Aid History, in POVERTY LAW MANUAL FOR THE NEW 
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of welfare benefits, the adoption of state minimum wage hours for farm workers, 
and the expansion of food stamp and school lunch programs.85 
But shifts in the political climate in the 1970s caused the federal government 
to limit its largesse. Major legal victories for OEO-funded legal societies against 
the government caused some politicians to question “why the government was 
paying lawyers to sue it.”86 In an effort to undermine the viability and success of 
legal aid societies, President Richard Nixon created the Legal Services Corporation 
(LSC), an independent organization that received federal money that was to be 
distributed to local civil legal aid societies.87 First, Nixon decreased funding to 
LSC. In 1982, politicians slashed LSC’s budget to $241 million, down from $680 
million just two years earlier,88 with a concurrent decline of twenty-five percent of 
legal services offices nationwide.89 Today, state and local governments contribute 
nearly as much as LSC does to groups that advance civil legal services.90 But the 
combined contribution of $535 million still lags behind the $680 million of thirty 
years ago.91 
Next, Nixon and Congress passed rules, many of which are still in effect 
today, that limited how government money could be used by the civil legal aid 
societies. Today, civil legal aid societies that receive funds from LSC may not, 
among other activities, engage in class action litigation, engage in litigation that 
affects issues before Congress, or represent clients with welfare claims.92 The new 
rules have effectively crippled the efforts of civil legal aid societies to effect 
broader change.93  
The rules passed by Nixon and Congress also limited the individuals whom 
legal aid societies may help. Groups that receive LSC funds may not provide legal 
services to prisoners, undocumented aliens, or anyone with an income above 
125% of the poverty level.94 Nor may LSC-funded groups use federal funds to 
litigate cases that might generate fees if the case had been litigated by a private 
lawyer.95 
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86. Adcock, supra note 81, at 25, 36. 
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Since the Nixon-imposed cuts, civil legal aid societies have focused on 
providing basic legal services to low-income clients. In 2011, 135 civil legal aid 
societies that received LSC funding saw a total of 899,817 cases that fell into ten 
broad categories: consumer, education, employment, family, health, housing, 
income maintenance, individual rights, juvenile, and miscellaneous.96 The majority 
of those cases—over sixty percent—involved family matters (including adoption, 
child support, custody, divorce, and other family issues) and housing disputes 
(with the vast majority of housing disputes traditionally focused on landlord-
tenant issues).97 
While a portion of the low-income population receives help from civil legal 
aid societies, the restrictions attached to funding have left a number of people and 
legal causes outside the realm of what can be accomplished by civil legal aid 
societies. Restrictions placed on funding mean that only seventeen percent of the 
population qualifies for services from legal aid societies that receive money from 
LSC.98 And for every 14,000 people who qualify for civil legal aid under LSC, only 
one full-time equivalent attorney exists.99 When the pool is expanded to include 
attorneys who work for non-LSC funded civil legal aid groups and eligible clients, 
the number drops to one attorney for every 7000 eligible people.100 A recent study 
suggests that the current civil legal aid system meets less than one-fifth of the 
needs of low-income people.101 Those who do qualify for legal assistance must 
choose from societies that provide specialized services, “including homeless 
assistance, family law, eviction defense, debt collection defense, guardianships, and 
home equity fraud.”102  
2. Law School Clinics 
At roughly the same time that civil legal aid societies took shape in the early 
twentieth century, law schools began developing live-client legal clinics that served 
the poor. Beginning with the University of Pennsylvania and followed by Harvard 
Law School and George Washington University, universities established legal aid 
societies in an effort “to help members of the community who are too poor to 
hire a regular attorney in those cases where they need a lawyer’s services, and, 
second, to give students the practical education that comes from the experience of 
handling real cases.”103 Later, in the 1960s, at the same time that the OEO granted 
money to community-based legal aid societies, twenty-nine of the eighty-six 
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university-based legal clinics received funding from the OEO.104 In addition to the 
OEO money, at the same time nineteen law schools received over $800,000 from 
the Council on Legal Clinics, a private foundation significantly funded from the 
Ford Foundation.105 This money was to be used to fund poverty law clinics and 
“to discover and lay out new and better methods of educating law students about 
their future role as members of a profession.”106 
Today, law school legal clinics provide a nominal amount of legal service to 
members of the community. Through over 809 legal clinics at 131 law schools, 
supervised law students provide legal services free of charge to people with 
general civil litigation needs, as well as in the areas of community economic 
development, immigration, and children and the law.107 But the combined efforts 
of law students and supervising attorneys are the equivalent of 788 full-time 
lawyers each year.108 Despite the impact that live-client legal clinics have on many 
individuals’ lives, the overall effect of the clinics on demand for legal services from 
the poor is low. 
3. Law Firm Pro Bono Programs 
Since the 1980s, pro bono programs at large and small law firms have 
evolved to help fill the gap left by civil legal aid societies. Efforts to provide legal 
services to the poor pro bono—an arrangement through which lawyers donate 
time and firm resources to litigate a claim for a party—began to take shape in the 
1970s and quickly evolved during the 1980s for various reasons, such as efforts by 
the bar to encourage lawyers to help fill the gap caused by the limitation on LSC 
funding,109 law firms’ use of pro bono to attract graduates from top law 
schools,110 American Lawyer ’s ranking of law firms based on their pro bono 
activities,111 and professional model rules that encouraged lawyers to engage in pro 
bono.112  
The type of cases pro bono attorneys litigate depends on the size of the firm 
in which the attorney practices. Lawyers at small law firms of between two and 
five attorneys—which comprise sixty percent of all lawyers in private practice—
provide free or reduced fee representation to low-income clients that supplements 
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services offered by other civil legal aid societies.113 This includes help with divorce 
cases, personal bankruptcy, and similar small cases. One study has shown, 
however, that a large portion of the pro bono work conducted by solo and small 
firms is not given to the poor, but is given to friends and family, or the lawyer will 
report work done for clients who failed to pay a bill as pro bono.114  
Larger law firms, which have greater man power and resources to devote to 
cases, often take on large-scale, reform-oriented cases that focus on a legal cause 
rather than an individual’s legal claim. These cases tend to be the cases that LSC-
funded organizations are barred from pursuing and that smaller public private 
firms or small practitioners cannot take on because of resource limitations.115 A 
recent study found that large firm pro bono efforts tended to focus on cases 
involving immigration issues, civil liberties, voting rights, children/youth issues, 
and environmental issues.116 To further the cause-based model of pro bono, firms 
have “signature projects” that “are designed to coordinate firm resources around a 
well-defined goal, create synergies between different practice groups, and build 
institutional knowledge and resources.”117 For example, Latham & Watkins 
sponsors a firm-wide initiative to help “unaccompanied refugee children detained 
by the government.”118 Likewise, Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe provides 
assistance to individuals with legal complications arising from HIV/AIDS.119 
But much like civil legal aid societies, many pro bono lawyers are 
institutionally constrained in the types of cases they can pursue. On one end of the 
spectrum of potential pro bono clients, some large firms will shy away from taking 
small claims or basic individual claims. One reason for this strategy is that large 
firms engaged in pro bono want to concentrate efforts on large-scale impact 
litigation out of a desire to capitalize on the greater resources of the firm. Another 
reason is because law firms want to create “positive public relations.”120 Firms 
engage in pro bono so that the firm can generate goodwill and good press by 
showing the impact that its assistance has on a population. A potential victory for 
an individual with a small claim will not generate the type of press that a victory 
for a larger cause would. That said, some firms have enacted clinic-based pro 
bono programs that attend to the basic legal needs of members of the community: 
domestic violence, wage-and-hour law, and landlord-tenant law.121 Firms advertise 
to the community that they will hold a clinic at a specific location on a certain day 
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or firm lawyers will staff social services offices on certain days.122 Such 
representation, however, reaches a limited audience. Firms that host clinics do so 
for limited hours on limited occasions; lawyers who visit social service offices are 
only able to help the clients that happen to be present when they are there.123 
Neither of these groups of people have any promise of legal help after the initial 
meeting. 
At the other end of the spectrum, firms must not accept large scale cases 
that might conflict with the regular business of the firm. Large firms generally 
represent corporate clients that are sued for an array of alleged offenses, including 
environmental damages, labor disputes, and consumer complaints. Because of the 
importance of these corporate clients to the firm’s bottom line, firms generally 
refrain from pursuing claims pro bono that might conflict with the interests of 
current or future clients.124  
4. Private Public Interest Law Firms 
Private firms that specialize in public interest law supplement the efforts of 
pro bono and civil legal aid societies.125 Generally, these firms “are oriented 
toward the enforcement and reform of laws and institutions that affect broad 
social groups.”126 This includes law as diverse as employment discrimination and 
basic human rights claims. Unlike civil legal aid societies, these firms do not 
receive funding from LSC or other governmental agencies that might limit what 
types of cases they can pursue. And unlike law firms that prioritize the interests of 
paying clients over pro bono clients, these firms rarely have to worry about 
potential client conflicts, so the firm can pursue large-scale impact litigation 
against corporations.127 This lack of restriction allows these firms to finance cases 
that “advance a vision of the public interest that enhances legal and political access 
for underrepresented groups or pursues a social change agenda that challenges 
corporate or governmental power.”128  
Unlike other for-profit law firms, private public interest law firms are not 
driven solely by profit. Indeed, “the ‘return’ [private public interest law firms] 
ultimately seek[ ] to maximize transcends economic profit.”129 Instead, the “raison 
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d’être” of this type of firm is to pursue the “righteous case”—the case that would 
have great social impact, that would “right a manifest wrong,”130 and that 
“presents a compelling injustice.”131 This includes cases that challenge broad 
education initiatives and requirements, cases that force multinational corporations 
to improve working conditions in factories, and cases that expose the human 
rights abuses of oil companies.132  
But litigating large-scale cases against corporations or governments is not 
cheap.133 While other for-profit law firms reinvest profits to finance future 
litigation,134 many cases litigated by private public interest law firms fail to 
generate profits. Some well-established private public interest law firms might 
have lines of credit that they can draw on to cover expenses,135 but other firms 
must self-finance much of their case load.  
To accomplish this, these firms have developed a portfolio model of 
litigating a set of cases with a double bottom line that balances social impact and 
generating fees. The firm will litigate low-risk cases that, if won, have a nominal 
social reward, but will generate fees for the firm either through monetary reward 
against the defendant or through money gained through fee-shifting statutes or 
private attorneys general fee provisions.136 Fee generating cases are still those that 
advance the core values of public interest law and generate “positive externalities”; 
these cases include employment discrimination, whistleblower antidiscrimination, 
and wage-and-hour laws.137 Money generated from these cases will finance the 
high-risk, high socially rewarding cases—the righteous cases. Sometimes these 
cases will generate massive fees for the firm,138 which can then be reinvested in 
future litigation. Other times, these cases generate no fees, only returning a social 
reward, or the case will be a loser.  
The importance of litigating the righteous case causes the private public 
interest law firm to miss helping many people. Cases are only taken by the firms if 
they will further the broader social purpose of the firm. But even if a case might 
further that broader purpose, a firm may decline it because any judgment or 
settlement would yield a small amount of fees. For example, private public interest 
law firms accept some employment discrimination cases or whistle-blower cases, 
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but they do so only if the monetary return on the time invested in those cases will 
be high. A partner at one private public interest law firm said that it only pursues 
such cases if the case will generate $400,000 or more in fees.139 Cases that would 
generate lower fees are declined so that the firm’s resources can be directed at 
efforts that will more efficiently further a righteous case. This keeps the firm from 
pursuing many cases that either fail to meet the value driven purpose of the firm 
or fail to generate the money the firm needs that will allow it to litigate the types 
of cases that further the values of the firm.  
As this section explored, the cause model of TPLF serves a diverse market, 
segmented by the institutional constraints placed on the financiers. While many 
people benefit from the provision of free legal services, many are left out. Pro 
bono programs provide litigation finance to many legal causes (environmental 
protection, immigration reform), but the focus on creating the greatest legal 
change comes at the expense of helping individuals with their basic legal claims. 
Private public interest law firms will litigate some of those basic claims 
(employment discrimination), but only if they provide a great-enough monetary 
reward. Civil legal aid societies provide help to members of the community with a 
wide variety of claims that neither pro bono programs nor private public interest 
law firms will pursue. But these legal aid societies are limited in their resources and 
turn down many cases. Who will take these rejected cases? 
B. The Profit Model 
For the plaintiffs who fall outside of the support system provided by groups 
in the cause model, contingency fee lawyers exist to pursue their claim. 
Contingency fee lawyers, the only group under the profit model of TPLF, pursue 
cases for litigants and finance the litigation expenses, including the cost of expert 
witnesses, bond requirements (for medical malpractice cases), court filing fees, and 
the lawyer’s time. Unlike financiers under the cause model, contingency fee 
lawyers typically operate with a single bottom line: generating a profit. In exchange 
for financing the claim, the lawyer receives a portion of any court-awarded remedy 
or settlement between the two litigating parties. This desire to generate a profit 
means that contingency fee lawyers typically take only cases that will result in a 
monetary award for the plaintiff; this includes all types of cases from social 
security to automobile accident cases, up to medical malpractice and product 
liability.  
Contingency fee lawyers, however, cannot take every case that offers a 
possible profit. Cash flow limits the number of cases a contingency fee lawyer can 
pursue.140 Cases like medical malpractice and commercial claims tend to be the 
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most profitable cases for a plaintiffs’ attorney.141 These types of cases, however, 
also tend to be the most expensive to litigate; they require expert witnesses, 
bonding, as well as the normal fees associated with litigating a case.142 As one 
plaintiffs’ attorney in Texas commented, medical malpractice cases “are way too 
technical . . . . Easily you can spend $100,000 without blinking . . . and we don’t 
have that kind of cash laying around.”143 But while large firms can draw down a 
line of credit to cover those up-front expenses, many contingency fee lawyers lack 
such an arrangement.  
To fund these cases, most contingency fee lawyers maintain a portfolio of 
cases including expensive, large-fee cases and inexpensive, low-fee cases. To fund 
the high-risk, labor-intensive, profit-generating cases, contingency fee lawyers 
litigate a larger number of low-risk, low-reward cases—workman’s compensation, 
personal injury, or social security. These cases generate the fees that provide firms 
with a cash flow to “keep the lights on”144—or pay the firm’s fixed costs—and 
leave a “reasonable profit.”145 Contingency fee attorneys then use the profit 
generated from these cases to finance a smaller number of more expensive, higher 
reward cases that generate the bulk of the firm’s profits.146 Indeed, the cash flow 
from the low-risk, low-reward cases is crucial in financing the higher risk cases; 
“[w]ithout cash flow coming in you can’t pay your bills and you can’t fund your 
cases.”147 
But even with the portfolio model, contingency fee lawyers cannot litigate all 
of the cases that fall through the cracks of the cause model. Surveys of lawyers in 
Texas and Wisconsin indicate that contingency fee lawyers turn away potential 
clients for a number of reasons. In Wisconsin, respondents suggested that they 
turn away at least half of the cases they are asked to take.148 While some of these 
cases were denied on their merits, others were denied because the costs were too 
high.149 A similar survey of plaintiffs’ attorneys in Texas found that attorneys 
decline to take cases because of an inability to “front the costs” of litigation for 
expensive cases like medical malpractice and commercial litigation; “the process of 
taking a case to court is getting enormously expensive.”150  
What, then, happens to the potential plaintiffs who cannot afford to litigate a 
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claim on their own and who are unable to receive litigation finance because their 
case fails to appeal to any of the other groups?  
III. GETTING MORE THIRD PARTIES TO PAY FOR COURT 
Until recently, cash-strapped contingency fee lawyers have had few options 
to increase cash flow so as to take on more clients. In the last six years, however, 
hedge funds, private equity groups, and banks have started investing in litigation, 
giving plaintiffs and law firms cash in exchange for a piece of any settlement or 
award.151 The practice is niche, with less than a dozen firms investing over $1 
billion annually in specific types of claims.152 While the practice is booming, 
contingency fee lawyers and their clients have received little, if any, of the 
investments.  
Making litigation finance available to contingency fee lawyers could 
dramatically increase access to justice. As discussed in Part II of this Note, 
contingency fee lawyers often handle the cases that other third-party litigation 
financiers refuse to litigate. By providing contingency fee lawyers with cash 
through investments, those lawyers would be able to litigate a larger number of 
cases and thus serve a broader group of potential litigants. For the plaintiffs that 
have been adversely affected by the heightened pleading standards of Iqbal and 
Twombly, these new investors could provide attorneys the cash flow necessary for 
the attorney to engage in effective prefiling investigations that would enable a 
complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. For the plaintiffs that have 
other claims that are expensive to litigate, like medical malpractice, the loans could 
provide the attorney with the cash necessary to hire expert witnesses or conduct 
more expansive discovery. 
This part will describe the financing schemes available to contingency fee 
lawyers and their clients as well as to large law firms and their clients. Contingency 
fee lawyers and their clients have traditionally been limited to loans. But evidence 
suggests that, in the wake of the recession, interest rates on those loans have sky 
rocketed, making it too expensive for contingency fee lawyers to use the loans.153 
Large law firms, on the other hand, have benefited from lines of credit with major 
banks. Recently, large law firms and their clients have additionally benefited from 
access to investment financing from hedge funds, private equity firms, and 
traditional banks. As this section will argue, due to the current market structure of 
litigation finance, contingency fee lawyers will likely soon benefit from greater 
access to the same litigation finance currently only available to large law firms and 
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law firm clients. As contingency fee lawyers receive more cash, litigants who have 
been locked out of the courtroom might gain greater access to justice.  
A. Existing Modes of Finance  
For contingency fee lawyers that lack enough cash to litigate claims, options 
to get more cash have been limited. Today, simple Internet searches reveal the 
number of banks and lenders that are willing to extend money to lawyers and law 
firms. But because of the private nature of the banks and the lawyers who accept 
the loans, no information is available about the pervasiveness of the practice. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some contingency fee lawyers have welcomed 
the cash. A Manhattan lawyer recently borrowed $45,000 from a litigation lending 
company, Ardec Funding, in June 2010 to help litigate a medical malpractice 
suit.154 The attorney used the money to hire several expert witnesses, including 
two doctors and an economist.155 Yet other evidence, such as the large numbers 
of lawyers that claim they have to turn down cases because of a lack of cash flow, 
as discussed in Part II of this Note, suggests that the practice is rare. 
Other end-around methods exist for contingency fee lawyers to receive 
money that could help litigate a case. Lenders in many states lend money directly 
to plaintiffs against any potential settlement or judgment.156 Called “consumer 
legal funding,” this practice has been available since as early as the 1980s.157 The 
loans advanced by the lenders presettlement or prejudgment operate similarly to 
loans advanced to lawyers: they are nonrecourse—if there is a judgment in the 
defendant’s favor, the plaintiff owes the lender nothing. Available evidence 
suggests, however, that these loans complement rather than supplement the 
contingency fee contract. Rather than using the money to further litigation efforts, 
plaintiffs use the money advanced to cover living expenses and doctors’ bills that 
accrue during trial or while the plaintiff is waiting to receive cash from a judgment 
or settlement.158  
B. New Models of Finance 
Recently, a new class of investors have entered the market to offer plaintiffs 
and lawyers money for a share of any settlement or judgment. Like the loans 
previously discussed, the investments are nonrecourse—if the plaintiff loses the 
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case, neither she nor her attorney are responsible for repaying the initial 
investment. But the investments are far larger than the loans. Burford Capital, one 
of the first investment groups to enter the market, typically invests between $3 
and $5 million dollars in a case and receives an agreed-upon percentage of the 
award or settlement, which can vary between ten and forty-five percent.159 
Investors have poured billions into litigation investments. As of 2010, at least 
six investment firms offer TPLF,160 with over a billion dollars invested each 
year.161 Several of the funds boast assets of hundreds of millions. Juridica Capital 
Management raised $180 million during initial public offerings on the London 
Stock Exchange, and Burford Capital had $300 million in capital for litigation 
investment as of 2012.162 And investors continue to enter the market;163 a 
Chicago-based fund backed by $100 million announced initial investment efforts 
in April 2013,164 and an Irvine-based fund opened a month earlier.165  
With so few investors engaged in litigation finance, litigation financiers can 
be picky. Although the firms engaged in litigation finance have hundreds of 
millions of dollars each to invest, the firms make few investments. Burford 
invested in only thirty-five cases over two years.166 As of 2013, Juridica 
Investments had only made twenty-four investments since 2007.167  
And the few investments that the firms do make go to high-reward, low-risk 
commercial cases that produce massive profits. While pro bono programs or 
private public interest lawyers might take claims that challenge legal precepts, the 
new litigation financiers only invest in cases that have the chance “to produce a 
substantial return.”168 The financiers specifically target cases where returns can be 
greatest by finding cases that are unlikely to be appealed, where the other side has 
 
159. Lawrence S. Schaner & Thomas G. Appleman, Third-Party Litigation Funding in the United 
States, 32 REVISTA DE ARBITRAGEM E MEDIAÇÃO 175, 178 (2012). 
160. GARBER, supra note 16, at 14. 
161. N.Y.C. BAR, FORMAL OP. 2011-2, THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING 1 (2014); 
Steven R. Strahler, Chicago Company Seeks to Profit from Lawsuits, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Apr. 8, 2013), 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20130408/NEWS01/130409842/chicago-company-seeks-
to-profit-from-lawsuits. 
162. Richard Lloyd, The New, New Thing: Two Publicly Listed Funds Are Investing in Early-Stage 
Commercial Litigation. Is This the Start of a Revolution, or a Sideshow for a Few Former Am Law 100 Lawyers?, 
AM. LAW., May 17, 2010; McDonald, supra note 16. 
163. Michael J. de la Merced, Firm Focused on Investing in Lawsuits Brings in Old Leader, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK ( Jan. 23, 2013, 4:21 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/firm-focused-
on-investing-in-lawsuits-brings-in-old-leader/. 
164. William Alden, New Firm Plans to Invest in Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 8, 
2013, 7:24 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/new-firm-plans-to-invest-in-lawsuits/. 
165. Casey Sullivan, Former Prosecutor Stolper Starts Litigation Finance Firm, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2013, 
3:46 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/13/us-usa-stolpernorell-idUSBRE92C07820130313. 
166. McDonald, supra note 16. 
167. JURIDICA INVS., LTD., ANNUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS 2012, at 6, available at http://
www.juridicainvestments.com/~/media/Files/J/Juridica/Annual%20Reports/reports/ar-2012.pdf. 
168. Jonathan D. Glater, Investing in a Portfolio of Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2009, at B8. 
         
2015] THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCE 221 
 
deep pockets to pay any judgment or settlement, or where liability has already 
been admitted.169 These tend to be antitrust, patent infringement, or commercial 
claims. The scheme is paying off. Burford Capital, one of the first groups 
organized that invests in commercial litigation, had a ninety-one percent return on 
its investment in 2011.170 
1. Law Firms As Beneficiaries  
Large law firms are one of the beneficiaries of the new investors. Shifts in 
the dynamics of the business of law have caused many law firms to seek out 
investments. Traditionally, large law firms billed clients during the course of 
litigation; the receipt of money from clients during litigation was then used to pay 
the firm’s fixed costs, as well as to fund the ongoing litigation efforts. In the event 
that a firm had a decreased cash flow, a firm could draw down a line of credit 
extended from a commercial bank.171 During the most recent recession, in 
reaction to excessive borrowing by some law firms, large banks decreased or 
eliminated lines of credit to law firms, leaving the firms without cash in times of 
need.172 Also as a result of the recession, some cost-conscious law firm clients 
have requested that firms offer alternative fee arrangements.173 In these 
arrangements, the firm may structure a hybrid fee arrangement with its business 
client, whereby the firm charges a lower hourly rate in the expectation of receiving 
a bonus upon favorable settlement or judgment.174 To replace the cash once 
received from banks and to supplement cash lost upfront because of the 
alternative fee arrangements, several law firms have received case-by-case litigation 
investment from a litigation financier in exchange for a portion of the damages or 
settlement.175 Juridica Capital Management, for example, places sixty percent of its 
active investments with AmLaw 200 firms.176 Burford Capital similarly invests 
mostly in litigation handled by large law firms, with the typical investment ranging 
from $3 to $15 million.177 An array of law firms have received the money, 
including Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, Latham & Watkins, and Patton Boggs.178 
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2. Businesses As Beneficiaries 
Businesses that are party to litigation have also received funding from the 
new financiers.179 In this situation, a corporate plaintiff that has a claim against 
another corporation will receive cash from a financier in exchange for a piece of 
the settlement or court award.180 A litigant might choose this route for a number 
of reasons. The litigant might lack the cash necessary to pay lawyers that bill 
hourly through the end of trial. The litigant might need cash to hire a more 
experienced—and more expensive—law firm to litigate the matter. Or the 
corporate litigant might accept the cash for more strategic reasons. When a 
business receives litigation financing, it might signal to the defendant the plaintiff’s 
belief in the quality of the claim and, in the process, gain the plaintiff a stronger 
bargaining position during settlement negotiations.181 
3. Contingency Fee Attorneys As Future Beneficiaries 
Contingency fee attorneys, like those discussed in Part II of this Note, have 
received only a small portion of the funding. Stephen Donzinger, a New York-
based plaintiffs’ attorney, received over $8 million in investments from several 
litigation investors, including Burford Capital, while he represented thousands of 
Ecuadorians in their lawsuit against Chevron for environmental damages.182 He 
used the money to hire environmental experts, attorneys in Ecuador, and 
eventually the Washington, D.C., firm Patton Boggs to aid in the litigation 
efforts.183 With the help of the investments, the legal team Donzinger assembled 
achieved a $19 billion judgment against Chevron.184 
But available information on investment strategies indicates that Donzinger 
is an exception to the norm. Available evidence suggests that contingency fee 
lawyers receive a small share, if any, of investments.185 Most of the firms that 
invest in litigation are privately held, which means they do not have to disclose 
their investment activity.186 And many firms and businesses that seek litigation 
investments ask that their names not be disclosed.187 But, Richard Fields, 
Chairman of the Board at Jurdicia, has noted that Juridica “won’t invest in 
 
179. Id. The other forty percent of Juridica’s investments go directly to the plaintiff-business. 
Id. 
180. Steinitz, supra note 18, at 1276. 
181. GARBER, supra note 16, at 15. 
182. Steinitz, supra note 20, at 467–68. 
183. Keefe, supra note 19, at 43–44. 
184. Andrew Smith, Chevron to Fight Multi-Billion Ecuador Ruling, CNN MONEY (Feb. 15, 2011, 
8:17 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/15/news/international/chevron_amazon/index.htm. 
185. See Kritzer, supra note 5, at 270–72; Schneyer, supra note 5, at 372 n.12. 
186. See Lloyd supra note 162. 
187. See id.; see also McDonald, supra note 16. 
         
2015] THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCE 223 
 
personal injury, mass torts, or class actions,” the types of cases typically handled 
by contingency fee lawyers.188 
Contingency fee lawyers could soon receive litigation investment as the 
market for litigation investment evolves. On one side of the equation, more 
investors will continue to enter the market. While the annual investment in 
litigation is estimated at $1 billion, approximately $300 billion is spent on litigation 
each year;189 the gap between the amount invested and amount spent on litigation 
represents the amount of opportunity for greater investment. Similarly, as the 
recession continues to wane, banks that stopped lending to law firms during the 
recession will likely reenter the market.190 Those banks will likely lend money to 
law firms at lower effective equivalent interest rates than offered through litigation 
investment.  
Other banks and large, traditional, institutional investors that have refrained 
from investing in litigation may, too, enter the market. Some commentators 
believe that these investors have remained out of litigation finance due to the 
negative stigma surrounding the practice.191 The stigma likely derived from the 
practices of investors who often lent money to individual plaintiffs that were often 
involved in personal injury cases.192 But as investment funds and reputable law 
firms continue to enter the litigation finance market, the negative stigma will likely 
decrease. As the stigma decreases, the traditional, institutional investors may enter 
the market as well.  
As new investors enter the market, investors will have to seek out new 
investment opportunities. The hedge funds and private equity funds that continue 
to enter the market now do so because of the high profit margins available. And 
indeed, firms continue to enter the market. Through April 2013, two new 
investment firms have entered the market.193 As more of these investors enter the 
market, the availability of high-stakes, low-risk commercial claims will eventually 
dry up. Some attorneys have already recognized this. Boston attorney Anthony M. 
Doniger recently said, “I don’t have a sense that there’s any burgeoning need” for 
litigation finance among large firms.194 One recent article in a legal magazine has 
confirmed that investors have contacted smaller sized law firms: New England-
based attorneys claim that they have received more solicitations for litigation 
finance recently.195  
As investment strategies evolve and investors look for new opportunities, 
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contingency fee lawyers might start to receive investment opportunities for a few 
reasons. First, contingency fee lawyers and litigation financiers have perfectly 
aligned incentives. Contingency fee lawyers, much like litigation financiers, pursue 
cases that, if followed through to settlement or judgment, will produce an award 
that will yield a profit.  
But, as discussed in Part II of this Note, contingency fee lawyers decline to 
litigate many potentially profitable cases each year simply because they lack the 
capital necessary to litigate the case. While some contingency fee lawyers may have 
access to loans, borrowing money is expensive and difficult to get. Banks have 
become more selective in their lending practices, evaluating firm financials more 
deeply and requiring personal guarantees on money advanced.196 Then, when 
banks lend the money, it comes at great costs. Take the case mentioned above, 
where the attorney borrowed $45,000 to fund a medical malpractice suit. While 
the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages of $510,000, the 
attorney has had to pay $900 a month in interest payments—annualized to a 
twenty-four percent interest rate—until the award is paid.197 Such a great expense 
likely makes contingency fee lawyers reluctant to take out loans. While the loans 
provide access to cash to pay for litigation, the interest payments on the loans 
decrease the cash flow of the firm. Although the loan provided the cash necessary 
to pursue one case, the need to service the loan may prevent a firm from pursuing 
another case. But if contingency fee lawyers had access to cheaper financing, they 
could pursue more cases, generating more profits for both their firms and for the 
financiers.  
Second, the new investors that will likely enter the market might have a taste 
for investments with lower capital commitments than those currently extended by 
financiers to large law firms and businesses. This desire for lower capital 
commitments might derive from investors’ desire to invest in cases that require 
less capital or from investors’ desire to make smaller investments in larger cases. 
Either way, the amount of money involved in cases litigated by contingency fee 
lawyers tends to be quite lower than the money involved in cases financed by the 
new third parties. Contingency fee lawyers in Texas reported receiving awards and 
settlements that approached $750,000 dollars for medical malpractice cases;198 
employment discrimination cases reported by contingency fee lawyers in Los 
Angeles similarly reported judgments that reached several hundreds of thousands 
of dollars.199 For awards that size, the amount of investment needed will likely be 
far less than currently offered by investors; an amount potentially attractive to new 
investors.  
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4. Increased Access to Justice  
As discussed in Parts I and II of this Note, contingency fee attorneys must 
turn away potential client-plaintiffs because the attorney cannot afford to litigate 
what might be a meritorious claim. For some attorneys and clients, this problem 
has become more acute in the wake of Iqbal and Twombly. Critical facts to a case 
used to be unearthed during discovery, the costs of which were generally paid by 
the defendant. But changes in pleading rules now require plaintiffs to include 
those facts in their pleading.200 This requires plaintiffs (or the plaintiffs’ attorney) 
to pay for a prefiling investigation to uncover those facts. As some plaintiffs (or 
their attorneys) are unable to pay for the investigation, some cases are never 
pleaded while others fail to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because the 
pleading lacked sufficient factual allegations.  
But with easier access to financing, contingency fee lawyers will be able to 
help solve the access to justice problem exacerbated by Iqbal and Twombly. For 
claims most affected by the heightened pleading standards, contingency fee 
lawyers might best handle the FLSA claims, contract claims, and consumer credit 
claims because of the potential for a monetary settlement or judgment. With 
access to litigation finance, the contingency fee lawyer could help the above 
classes of plaintiffs gain access to justice in one of two ways. First, the attorney 
could simply engage in a prefiling investigation that would uncover the facts 
necessary to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The attorney might 
uncover the same facts during this investigation that she would have otherwise 
uncovered during discovery. While the prefiling investigation will not guarantee a 
favorable outcome for the plaintiff, it increases the chances that the plaintiff will 
reach the same outcome that he would have under the Conley regime.  
Second, by receiving litigation finance, the plaintiff’s attorney sends a strong 
signal to the defendant about the strength of their case. Defendants and defense 
attorneys might understand that contingency fee lawyers that have cash will be 
able to engage not only in the prefiling investigations, but also will be able to pour 
more resources into other phases of the trial. Such a signal might encourage 
defendants to settle cases early on in the litigation process.  
The access to cash could further help other potential plaintiffs whose cases 
are typically handled by contingency fee lawyers. In the surveys of contingency fee 
attorneys in Wisconsin and Texas, discussed in Parts II and III of this Note, the 
attorneys noted that they are constrained in the number and types of cases they 
can pursue due to costs. Attorneys in both states stated that they must turn down 
high-reward cases, like medical malpractice, because they or their firm lack the 
cash needed to pay for the litigation expenses.201  
Increasing access to justice through litigation finance seems possible. While 
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contingency fee lawyers can currently borrow money from lenders, the costs of 
borrowing are too high. But a further expansion of a new form of litigation 
finance could soon reach contingency fee lawyers. As the money reaches 
contingency fee lawyers, plaintiffs who cannot afford to litigate their own claim 
and lawyers who cannot afford to litigate the claim for them could soon see their 
day in court.  
But, for this possibility to become a reality, legal regimes and professional 
rules need to be adopted or amended. Investing in litigation violates centuries-old 
laws concerning how lawsuits are brought to court. The argument can—and has—
been made that this new form of TPLF is still illegal. But, as the final part of this 
Note will explore, states have started adopting or amending existing legal and 
regulatory regimes to allow for TPLF. But more needs to be done to ensure that 
the new financing scheme can benefit the greatest number of people. This Note 
will conclude with suggestions on what changes in rules need to be adopted or 
amended for this to happen.  
IV. ALLOWING MORE THIRD PARTIES TO PAY FOR COURT 
To allow for the meaningful expansion of TPLF, professional rules and legal 
regimes need to be changed or developed. Critics of the new form of litigation 
finance argue that the practice violates a constellation of ethical and professional 
rules; because of those conflicts, they argue that any expansion of TPLF should be 
banned. These critics also claim that the new form of litigation finance will cause a 
number of evils, including the filing of more frivolous litigation. But while the 
expansion of the new form of litigation finance comes into tension with certain 
rules or regulations, the benefits of the expansion, as addressed in Part III of this 
note, outweigh the potential costs. Because of the potential benefits, bar 
organizations and state and federal legislators should consider modifying or 
introducing new rules and regulations that will allow this new form of litigation 
finance to benefit those who need access to it to litigate their claims. This part of 
this Note will explore the various objections to the expansion of litigation finance, 
and at each step, suggest modifications to current rules or regulations, propose 
new regulations, and dispel certain claims critical of litigation finance.  
A. Champerty and Maintenance 
The legal status of this new form of TPLF is complicated. Traditionally, the 
common law proscribed such investing. During the Middle Ages in England, 
courts adopted rules that dated back to ancient Greece and Rome that prohibited 
one party from funding another party’s lawsuit.202 Laws against maintenance 
prohibited “assist[ing] a litigant in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit; [or] 
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meddl[ing] in someone else’s litigation”203 More specifically, laws against 
champerty, a type of maintenance, prohibited a person who is not party to a suit 
from funding the suit in exchange for a portion of the settlement or judgment.204 
In England, courts used the laws to prevent the landed gentry from funding 
lawsuits that belonged to a poor person.205 The gentry used such lawsuits to 
diminish the power of rival land owners or to challenge the power of the courts.206  
Some courts in the United States declined to adopt or enforce the rules 
through the common law. While many states acknowledge the common law 
doctrines of maintenance and champerty,207 courts were loath to enforce the rules 
because they “had no real foundation in the United States.”208 The Supreme Court 
first declared the permissibility of contingency fees in the face of laws against 
maintenance in the 1877 case of Stanton v. Embrey.209 There, the Court noted that 
“[t]he proposition (i.e. that contingent fees are legal) is one beyond legitimate 
controversy.”210 States, one-by-one, approved laws that exempted contingency 
fees from laws against maintenance, with Maine becoming the last state to 
approve the fees in 1965.211 Courts similarly chose not to enforce laws against 
maintenance with regard to those who provided legal services to the poor.212 The 
Supreme Court formally ruled in 1963 that civil legal aid societies could sue on 
behalf of others, under the protection of the First Amendment.213  
Now, as more attorneys receive investment from third parties, many states 
have grappled with whether the laws against maintenance and champerty should 
be enforced or resurrected. Some states, like Massachusetts and South Carolina, 
have fully abandoned the rules against maintenance and champerty.214 Indeed, one 
study conducted in 2010 found that twenty-eight states permit maintenance in its 
broadest form, with sixteen of those states explicitly permitting champerty.215 
Other states have taken a middle path. Legislators in Ohio and Maine have passed 
laws that permit champertous relationships, but require the financiers to register 
with state authorities.216 And yet other states have ratcheted up laws that proscribe 
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investing. Courts in Minnesota and Nevada, for example, have specifically stated 
that investing in lawsuits is champertous and, thus, illegal.217 
B. Concerns over Increased Litigation 
Business leaders have also expressed concerns over the expansion of 
litigation finance. One criticism of the new form of TPLF is that giving potential 
plaintiffs and litigators more money will “permit[] [them] to offload risk” and 
encourage plaintiffs and attorneys to file more lawsuits, many of which would be 
frivolous.218 Furthermore, the critics argue that the increased filing of lawsuits will 
strain an already overburdened civil legal system and increase the cost of business 
because of the need to defend the claims against them.219  
These concerns, however, are slightly overblown. As previously discussed, 
the newest wave of litigation finance has not resulted in a massive number of 
lawsuits filed. Two of the six companies that have funded lawsuits have only 
invested in fifty-nine cases since 2007.220 As TPLF evolves, and this Note suggests 
that it will, more lawsuits will inevitably be filed than would have been without 
litigation finance. Such has been the case in Australia, where the type of TPLF 
that is expanding in the United States has been legal in many jurisdictions since as 
early as 2006.221 In a 2009 study by David Abrams and Daniel Chen, the two 
researchers found that the number of lawsuits filed in jurisdictions in Australia 
where litigation finance is legal had increased after litigation finance became 
legal.222 
But more litigation does not necessarily equate to more frivolous litigation. 
Financiers have little incentive to fund frivolous lawsuits. Litigation financiers 
have an interest—and in the case of the publicly traded companies, a fiduciary 
duty—in maximizing returns on investment. If a financier believes a case to be 
meritless or a loser, the financier will not likely invest in the case due to the 
potential loss on investment. Nor would a lawyer likely litigate a case if he believes 
it to be a loser. Although litigation finance will allow him to offload a portion of 
the risk that he normally would have carried if he litigated the case on 
contingency, the lower level of risk in his portfolio does not necessarily mean that 
he will pursue riskier cases. Nor does it mean that the attorney, nor a financing 
company, would litigate a truly frivolous case.  
More broadly, concerns that litigation finance might encourage more 
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litigation ignores the proposition that more litigation is not necessarily a bad 
outcome. Indeed, when litigation finance is provided to those who would pursue 
litigation but for the lack of capital, litigation finance helps those who have been 
locked out of the courtroom. As Parts I and II of this Note suggested, a large 
number of plaintiffs lack access to justice because either they or the contingency 
fee lawyers they hire cannot afford certain litigation expenses, like pretrial 
investigations, which would help them gain access to the courtroom. While 
providing these plaintiffs with the means to litigate their claims will necessarily 
cause more litigation, the right to sue over an injury, as noted in Marbury v. 
Madison, is “[t]he very essence of civil liberty.”223 Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly stated that “[o]ne of the first duties of government is to afford that 
protection”224 and that Americans have a “fundamental constitutional right of 
access to the courts.”225 
Furthermore, more litigation will benefit not only the individual who will be 
able to file a claim, but it will also benefit the legal system in general. In their 
research on Australia, Abrams and Chen compared a set of cases litigated with 
third-party finance to a set of cases that were funded without third-party 
finance.226 The cases that were financed and reached a favorable outcome for the 
funded party were cited, on average, over twice as often as the cases that were 
unfunded.227 This outcome suggests that cases that receive funding were not only 
meritorious, but they also created some procedural value by generating good law 
that has served as precedent for other cases.  
C. Concerns over Duty of Loyalty and Fiduciary Duty 
Critics also express concern that inviting financiers to take part in litigation 
might compromise a constellation of written and unwritten professional rules. For 
one, critics fear that introducing a third party will compromise the attorney-client 
relationship by introducing a party into the relationship whose goals and duty are 
different than the attorney and the client.228 The attorney is bound by the duty of 
loyalty to the client, which includes allowing the client to determine the course of 
litigation.229 If the client decides that she would like to settle the case at any 
point—even if it is for an amount less than the attorney believes is possible—the 
attorney must abide by the client’s decision.230 But, as critics argue, financiers owe 
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no such duty to the client.231 Instead, they might owe a fiduciary duty to 
shareholders who want to maximize the return on the investment. Critics fear that, 
in an effort to secure funding, clients may “relinquish some decision-making 
authority to the funder.”232 By giving the financier ultimate power, he will possibly 
litigate the case past settlement to a jury award in an effort to maximize the return 
on investment. In doing so, the purpose of the litigation will stray from making 
the plaintiff as whole as she would like to making the financier as whole as 
possible. 
More recently, concerns have been raised about how the structure of 
investments might displace the client as the primary beneficiary of any settlement 
or award.233 In cases where litigation finance has been provided to the attorney, it 
is unclear whether the financier’s stake in the settlement or reward is deducted 
from the attorney’s or client’s portion of the settlement or award. In a typical 
contingency fee contract between an attorney and the client, the attorney’s fee is 
calculated relative to the total settlement or award. Once the judgment is split 
between the attorney and the client, the attorney is also permitted to deduct from 
the client’s portion certain expenses incurred during the trial. The rules vary from 
state to state, but attorneys are generally permitted to further deduct expert 
witness fees, costs of investigation, and “other services properly chargeable to the 
enforcement of the claim or prosecution of the action.”234 A judge in New York 
recently insinuated that clients may be responsible for paying the litigation finance 
company, but only if the clients are informed that they will be responsible for such 
costs.235 
Another concern is who collects money from a settlement or judgment 
first—the clients, the attorney, or the financier? Because the firms that engage in 
litigation finance are typically privately held, and because the contracts signed 
between the financiers and the attorneys (and possibly with the clients) are not 
required in financial disclosures, little is known about how the agreements are 
typically structured. Recently, however, one controversial finance contract was 
made public. The contract was the heart of the litigation finance agreement 
between a group of Ecuadorians, represented by New York attorney Steven 
Donziger, and Burford Capital, as noted in Part III of this Note. Through the use 
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of subsidiaries and stage financing—where money is invested in blocks 
throughout the course of litigation as needed, rather than in one lump sum—
Burford invested $4 million with the possibility of a total $15 million in the 
Ecuadorian’s claim.236 The way Burford structured the contract ensured that they 
would receive any potential settlement or award before anyone else did.237 Fortune 
magazine analyzed the contract shortly after it was made public in court 
proceedings: 
If Burford ponies up the full $15 million and the plaintiffs end up 
recovering $1 billion, Burford will get $55 million. If the plaintiffs recover 
$2 billion, Burford gets $111 million, and so on . . . . If the plaintiffs 
recover less than $1 billion . . . Burford still gets the same payout it would 
have received if there had been a $1 billion recovery. . . . In that event, by 
the way, the remaining [amount of the settlement minus Burford’s $55 
million] would not go to the plaintiffs; rather, it would go to other 
investors, who are also supposed to get their returns on investment (not 
just their capital outlays) before the plaintiffs start seeing a dime. In fact, 
under the “distribution waterfall” set up by the 75-page contract, it is 
only after eight tiers of funders, attorneys, and “advisers” (including the 
plaintiffs’ e-discovery contractor) have fed at the trough that “the balance 
(if any) shall be paid to the claimants.”238 
The concern in each of the situations in this section is the same—the client’s 
interests are displaced by the financial interests of the attorney or the financier. 
Such an arrangement is incongruous with the basic notion that litigation should 
primarily benefit those privy to the substantive claim being litigated.  
Simple rules can and should be adopted to prevent these outcomes. 
Consumer protection laws should be developed such that a lawyer cannot engage 
a financier without the knowledge and agreement of the plaintiff. Since the 
presence of a financier will undoubtedly affect how the case is litigated, the client 
needs to have knowledge of the relationship. Once the financier is engaged, an 
assortment of other rules are then triggered. Primarily, the financier should owe a 
fiduciary duty to the client, similar to the duty of loyalty that the attorney owes the 
client.239 This fiduciary duty would accomplish several ends. First, this duty would 
require the financier to act in the best interest of the client, and to abide by the 
client’s wishes of when to end litigation; shareholders’ interest in maximizing 
returns to investment by continuing litigation through jury award will be 
supplanted by the client’s decision to settle earlier if she chooses.  
Second, this fiduciary duty should limit the financier’s involvement in 
litigation to a role no greater than that played by the attorney. This rule would 
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further the idea that the purpose of litigation is for the litigants to achieve the end 
that they desire. At no point can the financier direct the course of litigation; the 
client must at all times be able to end the litigation efforts when she chooses. The 
financier can act as a passive player in the litigation, only providing finance at 
agreed upon times. Or the financier can act as an advisor working in concert with 
the attorney on litigation efforts and strategy. 
This fiduciary duty should also expose the financier to many of the same 
liabilities attorneys face. If an attorney files a claim that is wholly meritless or 
invalid, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 permits the court to impose an 
“appropriate sanction” on the attorney and the attorney’s firm for violating the 
rule.240 Similarly, a plaintiff that files a meritless or frivolous claim can be sued by 
the defendant through the common law claim of malicious prosecution of a civil 
action.241 If a claim is financed by a third party, the third party should have an 
affirmative duty to investigate the legitimacy of the claim, otherwise the third party 
should be exposed to the same common law claim of malicious prosecution. Such 
a rule would act to prevent funds from financing meritless or frivolous litigation 
and encourage third parties to take an affirmative role in analyzing the merits of 
any investment in a case. Moreover, such an affirmative duty would encourage the 
third-party financier to become engaged in litigation strategy to ensure that the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys use the financing to further litigation efforts in legal and 
ethical ways.  
Recently, the cost of not making such investigations or taking a continued 
involvement forced Burford Capital to relinquish any stake in the $19 billion 
settlement reached against Chevron.242 In court papers filed in April 2013, 
Burford claimed to have conducted “months of due diligence” on the case against 
Chevron before agreeing to finance the litigation efforts.243 Despite the 
preinvestment analysis, Burford missed that Donziger and Patton Boggs, the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, had made numerous false and misleading statements to courts 
in both the United States and Ecuador.244 More than just false statements, by 
taking a passive role in the litigation, Burford missed that the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
might have bribed an Ecuadorian judge with $500,000.245 Burford also missed that 
a damage assessment supposedly drafted by a “neutral and independent” court-
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appointed expert was actually ghost written by the plaintiffs’ lawyers.246 As a result 
of the rampant fraud in the case, Burford sold its stake in the claim and 
relinquished any right the firm had to a portion of the award.247 Had Burford been 
involved in the litigation efforts, it could have possibly ensured that such fraud 
never would have happened.  
Secondly, the client should be notified of how the presence of a litigation 
financier will affect the client’s portion of any settlement or award. In Burford’s 
arrangement with the Ecuadorians, Burford set a recovery floor that established 
the lowest amount they would recover from any settlement or reward.248 This 
floor, however, was far more than what they invested and represented what 
Burford likely saw as a fair return on their investment, irrespective of what the 
plaintiffs fairly deserved. But financiers should only receive priority in recovery up 
to the amount they invested (the amount they invested as representative to the 
amount of risk they assumed). Once they have recovered their initial investment, 
they only receive the percentage of the settlement or award they agreed to, rather 
than a guaranteed minimum return up to the percentage stake.249 Such an 
arrangement would still serve the interest of financiers, in that they will recover 
their investment before the lawyer or client recovers anything. This structure also 
rewards the financier for the risk they assumed from the client and attorney by 
providing finance. But this structure also acknowledges that the client and 
attorney deserve a portion of the reward that represents the amount of risk they 
assumed.  
Once the financier has recovered their initial investment, the client should 
have to pay for the financier’s stake of the claim. As discussed earlier, several 
states have recognized that plaintiffs should have to pay for certain fees associated 
with litigation.250 Passing some fees associated with litigation finance onto the 
plaintiff does not seem wholly unfair. In a noncontingency fee arrangement 
between an attorney and a client, the client pays the hourly fees of the attorney 
plus any fees that accumulate during the course of litigation, including expert 
witness fees, filing fees, discovery fees, and so on; the contingency fee only 
represents a sum equal to a reasonable number of hours billed out at a reasonable 
hourly rate.251  




248. Steinitz, supra note 20, at 468. 
249. As an example, imagine a stylized arrangement based on the $18 billion award in the 
Chevron litigation in which Chevron was the only investor. If Burford invested $4 million in 
exchange for a 1.5% stake in the recovery, Burford should recover its $4 million investment initially 
plus $270 million from its share of the recovery, for a total of $274 million. But if recovery was only 
$100 million, Burford should only recover its $4 million investment plus $1.5 million. 
250. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
251. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 
166–69 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976); Steinitz, supra note 18, at 1306 n.143. 
         
234 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:197 
  
to other fees accumulated during litigation (so long as the invested money is only 
used to further the client’s litigation efforts, as opposed to paying for the fixed 
costs incurred by the attorney’s firm or for litigating other matters). This is 
because the money invested is used to acquire the same types of services that the 
client would have to pay for if financing was not used: hiring more attorneys, 
hiring more expert witnesses, paying for deeper investigations, and so forth. The 
clients simply have to be told from the outset that their portion of the settlement 
or award will be reduced accordingly.252 
D. Protecting Confidentiality  
Next, critics claim that bringing on a financier will violate confidentiality. 
Critics claim that before financiers will agree to invest in a suit, they will want to 
know details of the claim, which might include information given to the attorney 
by the client orally or in writing, as well as other information gathered or prepared 
by the attorney in anticipation of the litigation.253 Generally, these materials are 
considered confidential. Communications between client and the attorney are 
considered confidential through the attorney-client privilege and “documents and 
tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for 
another party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, 
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)” are also considered confidential under the 
work-product doctrine.254 But these communications and materials lose the 
protection of confidentiality and can be compelled for disclosure during discovery 
if the plaintiff or attorney waives either privilege by disclosing the information to a 
third party, such as a litigation financier.255  
These criticisms might be moot, however, because some financiers make 
investment decisions without the use of confidential information. Indeed, 
Kenneth Doroshow, a managing director at Burford told a bar association group 
in Massachusetts in early 2012 that “[w]e don’t ask for privileged information . . . . 
We diligence around privilege.”256 
But even if the financier would want access to confidential information, 
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courts have afforded broad protections to communications and work product. 
Beyond material prepared by the client’s attorney, the work-product doctrine also 
applies to documents prepared in anticipation of litigation “by or for” any other 
“representative” of the party, as codified in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 
26(b)(3).257 Furthermore, in Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the 
Third Circuit ruled that disclosure of material considered as work product to a 
third party does not amount to a waiver unless it would “enable an adversary to 
gain access to the information.”258 Other courts have acknowledged the need to 
share confidential information with financiers, allowing the communications and 
documents exchanged to remain confidential. In Mondis Technology, Ltd. v. LG 
Electronics, Inc., the court held that documents shared with potential financiers were 
considered work product and not available for discovery because sharing 
documents considered work product with potential financiers “did not 
substantially increase the likelihood that an adversary would come into possession 
of the materials.”259 
Another strategy to keep the documents confidential would be for the 
attorney and financier to codify their common interest in the outcome of the 
litigation by signing a nondisclosure agreement. The nondisclosure agreement 
would stipulate that the contracting parties have a common interest in the 
outcome of the litigation. This agreement would then trigger the common interest 
doctrine. The common interest doctrine protects from discovery documents 
exchanged between “attorneys representing different clients with similar legal 
interests.”260 In the case of litigation finance, the attorneys involved technically 
represent different clients. The attorneys who work for the financier represent the 
financier, and the attorney who works for the client represents the client; all of 
those attorneys share a similar legal interest in the outcome of the case being 
financed. By signing a nondisclosure agreement that stipulates confidentiality in all 
documents exchanged and outlines the common interest shared in the outcome of 
the litigation, courts will be more inclined to give protection to documents 
exchanged. Indeed, in litigation between Google and Walker Digital, where 
Walker Digital (the plaintiff) received litigation funding from IP Navigation 
Group, United States District Court Judge Sue L. Robinson of Delaware ruled 
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that “Walker Digital and IPNav do share a common interest and, therefore, any 
Walker Digital communications protected by the attorney-client privilege or work 
product doctrine do not lose that protection simply because they have been 
disclosed to IPNav.”261 
While the newest form of TPLF raises certain ethical, legal, and moral 
concerns, the practice should not be banned. Several states have already removed 
antiquated laws from their civil codes that would prevent the expansion of TPLF, 
while others have made efforts to expressly permit the practice. Other 
professional rules can be easily amended to better allow for TPLF. 
CONCLUSION 
Imagine a situation in which an injured person walks into a contingency fee 
lawyer’s office. The potential client tells the lawyer that her supervisor at work 
sexually harassed her; the harassment occurred over many months, several of her 
coworkers observed the episodes, and she reported each episode to the company’s 
human resources department. The potential client told the lawyer that when she 
finally resisted the harassment, the supervisor fired her.  
As the client tells the attorney the facts, he thinks how much will it cost me 
to plead this and survive a Rule 12(b)(6)? 
Pre-Twombly, the lawyer would have needed to plead the simplest facts that 
the potential client gave to him: that she was an employee at the certain business, 
the name of her supervisor, and the basic details of the harassment. Any other 
facts that would be necessary to convince the jury of the harassment or to compel 
the company to settle would be uncovered during discovery: the client’s 
employment records, records of the client’s reports of the harassment, records of 
efforts made by the company to remedy the harassment, and so forth.  
But now, with a heightened pleading standard, the lawyer must investigate 
those claims before he files so he can include the facts in the complaint. He might 
need to interview the client further to determine which coworkers observed the 
harassment, then he will need to interview the coworkers to get more facts 
regarding the client’s story. He might need to interview any doctors or therapists 
the client saw after the harassment began. He might also need to research whether 
the company has had past incidents of sexual harassment.  
All of this research takes time—time that the lawyer would have otherwise 
been spending on other cases, which would generate cash flow; or the time of an 
investigator for which the attorney pays. If the attorney lacks the cash, he might 
decline the case. The potential client might never see justice.  
 
261. Walker Digital, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 11-309-SLR, 2013 WL 9600775, at *1 (D. Del. 
Feb. 12, 2013); see also Devon IT v. IBM Corp., 2:10-cv-02899-JHS, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012). 
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But now imagine a situation in which the lawyer can call a financier who will 
provide the cash necessary to conduct the prefiling investigation. 
The potential benefits to society from expanding the practice are great. Since 
Marbury v. Madison, courts have acknowledged the right of potential litigants to 
have their claims heard by a judge. While the rulings in Iqbal and Twombly have 
presented potential litigants with a hurdle, the newest form of litigation finance 
could help them make the jump.  
While critics express several valid concerns about the expansion of litigation 
finance, this new wave of litigation finance simply continues a long practiced 
tradition of third-parties’ involvement in lawsuits. Rather than heeding to the fears 
of critics, bar associations and politicians should be mindful of the costs of the 
practice remaining unregulated, as seen in the Chevron litigation. But a full ban on 
the practice at this stage—in its infancy—seems imprudent, as we have yet to see 
how litigation finance might benefit more people as it becomes more 
democratized. Any full proscription on the practice could bar litigants with valid 
claims from accessing justice.  
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